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1
Because the analysis of risky choice in agriculture and rural resource management is 
important but difficult, we argue that there is a need for some agreed principles on how 
to proceed. This paper is intended as a first step to this end. We start with the 
proposition that the importance of risk aversion has generally been exaggerated relative 
to the task of finding better ways to deduce relevant and reliable probabilities. Getting 
better probabilities demands careful thought, drawing on what is know about the pitfalls 
and on evolving insights into better ways of proceeding. Our aim is to stimulate a 
debate leading to a clearer consensus about better practice in these matters. 
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Agricultural production is a risky business, and risk analysis and risk management tools 
have become increasingly popular in recent years. Unfortunately, some analysts have 
been rather cavalier in their use of the theory and methods of decision analysis. Given 
the complexity of risk analysis, it is hardly surprising that some mistakes have been 
made and that there is scope for disagreement on how to proceed. With mainly an 
econometric focus, Just (2000, 2003) and Just and Pope (2001) have assessed possibili-
ties and sound principles for research on agricultural risk.  
In this paper we seek to do the same for prescriptive decision analysis. The aim is to 
identify some of the main areas of difficulty and possible confusion in risk analysis in 
agriculture and to suggest some steps towards better practice. Our proposed principles 
of good practice are based on reasoned argument or relevant findings in the literature. In 
reality, not all analysis can or should strictly follow any formal rules; what is best will, 
of course, vary from case to case. However, we think it is useful to try to develop some 
guiding principles that will find broad acceptance and application.  
Some of our suggested principles may be contentious, in which case we hope that 
this paper will stimulate a discussion leading to a clearer consensus about how impor-
tant risky choices in agriculture can best be tackled.  
This paper is divided into six main sections. After this introduction there is a section 
on modelling principles, where we discuss the need for systematic analysis of risky 
choices in agriculture. In the third section we turn to expected utility and risk aversion, 
where the importance of these aspects in normative decision analysis is discussed. Then 
there is a small section on the state-contingent approach, where we speculate about the 
future use of this new theory in prescriptive decision analysis. Fifth, we discuss probabi-
lities for risk assessment. Here we address better ways to obtain the probability distri-
butions that describe the risk that farmers or farm policy makers face. The main 
emphasis in the paper is on this topic since we consider it to be the most important and 
the weakest aspect of current practice in applied risk analysis in agriculture. It is also 
likely to be the most contentious since we base our treatment on a subjectivist view of 
probability, in contrast to the relative frequentist view on which most agricultural and 
resource economists were reared. The paper ends with some brief concluding 
comments. 
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Farmers have always tried to find ways to manage risk by achieving better control over 
the production processes and by various forms of risk sharing. In addition, for many 
decades governments around the world have intervened to try to help farmers cope more 
effectively with risk. Yet in agriculture, as in other areas of human endeavour, risk 
remains an inevitable feature of life. But does risk in farm and policy decision making 
really matter? Clearly, some risks, such as the possibility of an outbreak of a highly 
contagious animal disease or an environmental catastrophe, must be taken seriously 
(e.g., Kunreuther 2002). Other risks, such as a temporary feed shortage on a grazing 
farm or low returns from a particular cash crop, can usually be ³ridden out´ by a 
reasonably solvent and competent farm operator. Evidently, only ³important´ risks are 
worthy of systematic analysis ± a point not always reflected in the professional 
literature.1 Our starting point, therefore, is that there are important risky choices faced 
by policy makers and farmers that warrant systematic analysis to assess the ³best-bet´ 
course of action.  
Risk can be important because, in a nonlinear system, even setting input variables at 
their mean values will give a biased (and usually over-estimated) value of the payoff 
measure (Anderson 1976; Hardaker et al. 2004a). This effect, which Hardaker et al. 
(2004a, pp. 8±11) call downside risk, occurs whether decision maker is risk averse or 
not. Risk analysis is needed to deal with it. 
In addition, if a decision maker is risk averse, an analysis of risky choice based on 
maximising expected money value will generally not lead to the option that will be most 
preferred (Arrow 1951; Robison and Barry 1987). The size of the bias depends on the 
                                                 
 1 The problems reported in the literature seem too often to have been chosen because abundant data 
were available rather than for their importance. That is rather like the drunk who is looking for lost car 
keys, not where they were lost in the dark, but under a street light, on the mistaken basis that this is 
where he can see. 
 
Towards some principles of good practice for decision analysis in agriculture 
Centre for Food Policy/Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 2005 
6
riskiness of the particular decision and on the degree of risk aversion of the decision 
maker. 
These considerations lead us to our first proposed principle: 
 
 
 
 
 
This principle partly based on the proposition that, because systematic risk analysis 
requires more information and judgments about the uncertainties to be faced than deter-
ministic analysis, it should lead to an estimate of expected consequences that is at least 
no worse than that obtained by deterministic analysis (Morgan and Henrion 1990). 
Moreover, by having information about the distribution of the consequences, a better 
assessment of the risks can be made, leading to what should be a better choice. 
Advocates of deterministic analyses often claim that ³risk´ is accommodated by 
sensitivity analysis. Yet, at least as conventionally applied, sensitivity analysis is a poor 
substitute for a proper risk analysis. As Reutlinger (1970) argued, the results of varying 
selected uncertain coefficients are of little use unless accompanied by a thoughtful 
specification of their probability distributions, or at least of their feasible ranges. More-
over, the usual one-by-one variation of uncertain coefficients gives no attention to 
possibly crucial stochastic dependencies between variables. 
Anderson (1976) argued that ³full disclosure of information and its quality´ is impor-
tant in modelling. In analyses under assumed certainty, disclosing uncertainty about key 
coefficients is rare and may even be viewed by some as an admission of weakness. On 
the other hand, risk analysis requires careful consideration of these uncertainties and, at 
least for major sources of uncertainty, the explicit modelling of the uncertainty as part 
of the analysis. Provided the data, assumptions and results are presented in an informa-
tive way, risk analysis therefore provides more transparent decision support. 
Many people baulk at the inevitable subjectivity of most risk analyses. Certainly, 
there is ample evidence of the fallibility of human judgment. The difference is that risk 
analysis exposes the subjectivity while analysis under assumed certainty typically hides 
it. Systematic risk analysis does not overcome the fallibility of human judgments, but 
the need for analysts to think more deeply about the uncertainty associated with the 
problem at least means that the bias inherent in single-valued estimates may be reduced 
(Morgan and Henrion 1990).  
Finally, on the demand side, many questionnaire surveys have shown that farmers 
view some risks as worrisome (e.g., Wilson et al. 1993; Martin 1996; Meuwissen et al. 
2001; Koesling et al. 2004), suggesting a need for farm management consultants and 
advisers to make use of modern decision analysis tools to support farmers in coping 
with these important risks. Some recent spectacular failures in public policies relating to 
risk management, in agriculture but more so in other areas, imply a need for better risk 
analysis in public decision making. 
Despite the arguments advanced above, tackling the evaluation of risky choices can be 
difficult and demanding. The difficulty at farm level arises in part because agricultural 
businesses, as other businesses, are often best modelled in a system context. That 
implies a need to cast the decision analysis in a context of the whole-farm (or the whole-
firm and household), rather than in a partial context. A system view includes dynamic, 
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stochastic, biological, technical, financial and human factors that interact (Pannell et al. 
2000). Further, within a broad system context, all possible on-farm and off-farm 
alternatives and all the risks bearing on those activities should ideally be considered in 
the model of agricultural decision analysis (e.g., Anderson 1982; Richardson and Nixon 
1986; Hardaker et al. 2004a).  
Even in a marginal analysis, there is usually more than one uncertain quantity to be 
considered, and in a whole-farm analysis there will be many. Consequently, as 
discussed below, stochastic dependency between variables may be an important, raising 
difficult and often neglected issues (e.g., Reutlinger 1970; Taylor 1990; Smith et al. 
1992; Livny et al. 1993; Hardaker et al. 2004a). 
Evidently, fully comprehensive modelling is likely to be difficult, sometimes perhaps 
impossible. Even if technically feasible, too much complexity makes a model difficult 
to build, debug and use, and may give results very little better than could have been 
obtained from a simpler representation. Morgan and Henrion (1990, ch. 12) argue that a 
complex model often will do a worse job than a simpler one. They mention the 
difficulties that have occurred when attempts were made to construct and use the large 
social, economic, and environmental global models in the 1960s and 1970s. It is there-
fore best to keep the model as simple as is judged reasonable. The intention with 
decision analysis is not to give exact answers, but to highlight relative consequences of 
different alternatives, and to develop insight and understanding. Hence, as always, 
judgment is needed in the decision modelling task (Burmaster and Anderson 1994). A 
risk analysis need only be as sophisticated as is necessary to provide the decision maker 
with a good answer to the relevant problem in a timely manner (Richardson 2004; 
Hardaker et al. 2004a). These choices are essentially ³artistic´ in the same way as a 
portrait painter seeks to capture those features of a face or personality that seem most 
important for the task in hand. Hence, our second principle: 
 
 
By this we do not mean that the difficulty of the task should deter an analyst from 
attempting some modelling. Only exceptional people have the capacity to make wise 
decisions intuitively. For most of us, some decision analysis is likely to be better than 
none, at least for important risky choices (Arrow 1951). 
By the nature of the artistry entailed, there can be few firm guidelines on how to do 
decision analysis well. However, drawing on Clemen (1996, chs 2 and 3), we can list 
some basic steps:  
1. identify and structure the values and objectives;  
2. structure the decisions (often sequential) into a logical framework;  
3. identify the risky events and dovetail them with the sequence of decisions; 
4. identify and evaluate the consequences of the various decision and event sequences 
in terms of the relevant objectives;  
5. refine and clarify the definition and specification of all elements of the decision 
model; 
6. analyse and solve the decision problem to be able offer guidance to the decision 
maker.  
 
The preliminary structuring steps 1 to 3 above are very important since it is through 
these steps the analyst is forced to understand the problem and all its different aspects. It 
is also in the structuring process that ³artistic´ choices have to be made about what to 
do and how to do it. For example, it is important to think carefully about which uncer-
tainties should and not should be represented by probability distributions (Morgan and 
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Henrion 1990, pp. 50±56). Vose (2000, pp. 6±12) suggests that a preliminary informal 
analysis can be used to exclude from the model those uncertainties that have a low 
impact on the riskiness of the consequences.  
Tools that are useful in the early stages of problem specification include influence 
diagrams and outline or more complete decision trees (e.g., Clemen 1996; Hardaker et 
al. 2004a). Once the structuring stages are completed, there is a wider range of methods 
that can be used for decision analysis. This is not the place to describe the latter 
methods as there are several texts that do that.2 What is important to note is the great 
increase in capacity for risky decision analysis that has been brought about by the 
increased availability of powerful, special-purpose software. Tasks that 30 years ago or 
more took many days of work can now be completed almost with the click of a mouse. 
The very ease of use of some of these methods brings its own dangers, notably the risk 
that analysts may rely too much on the software without thinking sufficiently carefully 
about the modelling task and how it is best done. 
Particularly important as part of step 2 above is the need to think carefully about 
what the decision maker can do to adapt to bad or good outcomes as they unfold. Here 
too, imaginative thinking may be needed to find the realistic tactics to deal with the out-
comes, especially bad ones. For an example of an analysis that included such tactical 
responses, see Kingwell et al. (1993). A failure to include such tactical responses in the 
analysis contributes to the over-estimation of the importance of risk aversion, discussed 
below. 
Although artistry is unavoidably entailed at all stages in the analysis of risky choice, 
validation of the model developed is important to check that it provides a reasonable 
representation the actual problem (van Horn 1971; Sargent 2004). While there are a 
number of ways to approach this task, it is often a matter of reviewing and refining, as 
listed in step 5 above. Ultimately, of course, it is the decision maker(s) who must find 
the analysis credible; an essentially subjective judgment. 
                                                 
 2 Our own overview of what is useful is, of course, to be seen in Hardaker et al. 2004a. 
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The Subject Expected Utility Hypothesis (SEU), also know as Bernoulli¶s Principle, has 
a long and distinguished history (e.g., Bernoulli 1738; Ramsey 1931; von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1944; Arrow 1951; Savage 1954). Basically, the hypothesis is that rational 
persons will seek to make risky choices consistently with what they believe, as 
measured by their subjective probabilities, and with what they prefer, as evaluated via 
their utility functions for consequences. The decision maker¶s utility function for out-
comes is needed to assess risky alternatives since the shape of the utility function 
reflects an individual¶s attitude towards risk (Anderson et al. 1977, pp. 66±69). The 
SEU hypothesis states that the utility of a risky alternative is the decision maker¶s 
expected utility for that alternative, meaning the probability-weighted average of the 
utilities of outcomes.  
The SEU hypothesis has been criticised because it has long been recognised that 
many people do not act consistently with the theory in certain risky choice situations 
(e.g., Allais 1984). The main critique has been the assumption about linearity in the 
probabilities (or equivalently, the independence axiom). Other axiomatic formulations 
(e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Quiggin 1993) have led to other more general 
theories that seem to model behaviour better. Recently, Rabin (2000) has shown that 
typical aversion to individual risky prospects with small losses is so great as to be 
inconsistent with any utility function expressed in terms of the utility of wealth. Such 
loss aversion implies failure in asset integration, meaning that people seemingly do not 
regard small gains and losses as changes in wealth (see, e.g., Binswanger 1981). 
Evidently the SEU hypothesis is flawed as a behavioural theory of choice (Rabin and 
Thaler 2001). 
In prescriptive applications, however, it is clear that loss aversion is irrational 
because, by the operation of the law of large numbers, over many small risky prospects 
with better than fair odds, it implies forgoing the opportunity of profiting with 
negligible chance of loss. Moreover, loss aversion often disappears when people are 
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given the opportunity of repeated choice or when the size of the risk faced is increased. 
Hence, for prescriptive decision analysis an assumption of rational preferences can be 
justified. Whatever may be our inclination, it makes sense to make most risky choices 
by regarding losses and gains as changes in wealth, which, after all, is just what they 
are. In other words, we should stick with the SEU hypotheses using a utility function for 
wealth if we want to act sensibly. So, we come to our third proposed principle: 
While the argument above in support of this principle is our own (as expounded also in 
Hardaker et al. 2004a, pp. 106±107), there is some consensus that, although alternative 
utility theories are more relevant in modelling behaviour, the SEU hypothesis remains 
the most appropriate theory for prescriptive assessment of risky choices (Machina 1987; 
Edwards 1992). Among agricultural and resource economists this view has been 
supported by Meyer (2001) and Just (2003).3 
While we believe the SEU hypothesis to be valid for prescriptive decision analysis, 
there are some significant difficulties in application. Although attempts have been made 
to elicit utility functions from relevant decision makers to implement the SEU hypo-
thesis in the analysis of risky alternatives in agriculture (Robison et al. 1984), the results 
have often been rather unconvincing (King and Robison 1984; Anderson and Hardaker 
2003). It seems that many people lack the introspective capacity to be able to respond 
consistently and convincingly to hypothetical questions about their risk attitudes (see, 
e.g., Huirne et al. 1997); a limitation that we suspect has sometimes been compounded 
by inept interrogation methods. Even when real money prizes have been offered 
(Binswanger 1981), it seems that loss aversion has led to results that are difficulty to put 
much faith in.  
If direct elicitation of risk attitudes has proved tricky, attempts to elicit risk attitudes 
from observed behaviour also confront a number of problems. First, such studies can 
only assess the decision maker¶s risk attitude in the past, while decision analysis in con-
cerned with evaluating future outcomes. Second, errors in model specification tend to be 
rolled into errors in the estimates of risk aversion coefficients, often causing over-
estimates. For example, omission of some constraints in whole-farm programming 
models may lead to the attribution of diversification to risk aversion when it is really a 
response to technical considerations such as the need for crop rotations for soil health, 
the need to spread work loads, or the need for reasonably regular income flows. Third, it 
is usual to assume that the decision maker¶s probabilities about the uncertain events of 
concern were the same as those of the analyst, the latter typically being drawn from 
some historical data that may not relate well to the actual experience and expectations of 
                                                 
 3 In recent decades, fuzzy set theory (Zadeh 1965) has been given increased attention for problems 
with high degrees of imperfect and inconsistent information (Taylor and Zacharias 2001; Taylor 
2003). The approach is not dealt with in this paper, but for interesting readers, applications of fuzzy 
set theory are given in, e.g., Cornelissen at al. (2001), Duval and Featherstone (1999) and Beynon et 
al. (2004). 
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the decision maker. For these or other reasons, some studies in the mould have found 
coefficients of risk aversion that seem hard to credit. 
These considerations lead to our fourth principle: 
 
 
 
 
Note that we are not asserting that relevant measures of risk aversion cannot be 
obtained, but rather are flagging the need for more care in the way this task is tackled 
and for more caution in interpreting the results. We believe, for example, that it is often 
possible to elicit a reliable utility function for wealth from well-motivated and well-
briefed decision makers.  
Partly to avoid the need to elicit a specific single-valued utility function (or a single 
value for a coefficient of risk aversion), methods under the heading of stochastic 
dominance or efficiency criteria have been developed. Stochastic dominance criteria are 
useful in situations involving a single decision maker whose preferences are not known 
precisely and in situations where there is more than one decision maker, such as in 
formulating extension recommendations for a group of farmers. Stochastic efficiency 
methods, and particularly SERF (stochastic efficiency analysis with respect to a 
function) (Hardaker et al. 2004b), provide a general approach that is consistent with the 
SEU hypothesis and that narrows down the range of choice to an efficient set. 
Moreover, the simple principle of exploring the impact on risky choice of varying the 
assumed degree of risk aversion within a plausible range can be applied to almost any of 
the forms of risk analysis. That should surely quieten those critics of decision analysis 
who see problems in utility function elicitation as a main stumbling block. 
On the other hand, there is a limit to what can be achieved by stochastic efficiency 
methods, so there is a continuing need for more work on how risk attitudes can be more 
reliably assessed. In this regard, Just (2003) has noted that elicitation of utility functions 
and estimates of risk attitudes have almost entirely focused on short-run problems. He 
argued that more research is needed on intertemporal risk attitudes, although just how 
that is to be done, given the difficulties noted above, is debatable. There is a similar case 
to be made that there has been too much focus on single-attribute utility functions when 
there exists ample evidence of the diversity of farmers¶ goals (e.g., Gasson et al. 1988; 
Bergevoet et al. 2004). Multi-attribute utility functions would also be useful in the 
analysis of risky choices in resource and environmental economics. 
Given the admitted difficulties in application of utility theory, how much importance 
should be attached to farmers¶ risk aversion in agricultural decision analysis? It is easy 
to find studies that imply that farmers¶ are very risk averse, even for quite marginal 
decisions. Some of these studies have been based on brave assumptions about the 
degree of risk aversion, often without explicitly saying what has been assumed or done. 
In contrast, some later studies have shown that the cost of ignoring risk may be small, at 
least for farmers¶ partial or short-term decisions (e.g., Pannell et al. 2000; Lien and 
Hardaker 2001). 
 
Towards some principles of good practice for decision analysis in agriculture 
Centre for Food Policy/Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 2005 
12
Reasons why the importance of risk aversion has been exaggerated include: 
1. too narrow analysis that ignores interactions with other activities and options on- and 
off-farm, including risk-sharing options and possibility for tactical or sequential 
adjustment; and 
2. over-estimates of decision maker¶s degree of risk aversion due to inappropriate elici-
tation of utility functions inducing loss aversion, or to biased estimates from studies 
of observed behaviour, both of which have been discussed above.  
Support for the above assertions may be found in, for example, Musser et al. (1986), 
Pannell et al. (2000), Meyer (2001), Just (2003), Hardaker et al. (2004a, pp. 86±89) and 
Malcolm (2004).  
The omission from the analysis of the possibility to respond tactically when events 
unfold (embedded risk) can lead to over-estimation of the importance of bad outcomes 
(Antle 1983; Pannell et al. 2000). Moreover, at least in more developed countries where 
access to credit is easy, most farmers with reasonable equity can readily ride out normal 
year to year variations in income flows (Just 2003).  
Assuming that asset integration makes sense, the decision maker¶s utility function for 
wealth is the appropriate one for prescriptive analysis. Risk aversion can be described 
by the absolute and relative risk aversion functions for wealth (Pratt 1964; Arrow 1965). 
Moreover, Arrow (1965) suggested that the value of the relative risk aversion function 
for wealth is not very far from one, and it seems likely that it is seldom above about four 
(Anderson and Dillon 1992). Then it is possible to derive estimates of the plausible 
range of absolute risk aversion coefficients for a range of assumptions about size of risk 
relative to wealth. Using such an estimated range, Hardaker et al. (2004a, pp. 113±118) 
show that, for capitalist farmers, risk aversion, though not negligible, is likely to be of 
small importance in affecting farmers¶ partial and short-term decisions. 
All this leads us to our fifth principle: 
 
The implication of this principle is that for many farm management decisions, it will be 
adequate to base choice on maximising expected money value. For cases where that 
seems a too strong assumption, the handling of risk aversion depends on how the 
problem is cast and hence on how the consequences are measured. Hardaker et al. 
(2004a, pp. 110±113) show how to get better consistency of risk aversion across payoff 
measures. For example, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion with respect to 
temporary income will usually be about the same as the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion with respect to wealth. However, it is not correct to apply the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion for wealth to the assessment of risky temporary income. 
Note that we do not assert the risk aversion never matters. It is likely to be important 
for asset-threatening decisions, e.g. major investments, since, by definition, these will 
have a larger impact on the decision maker¶s wealth than partial or and short-term 
decisions. For very poor farmers in less developed countries, even quite small risks may 
matter a lot. The general rule, however, is that it is the risks that threaten a farmer¶s 
long-term asset base that really matter (Just 2003).  
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Dealing with risk in public choice, in principle, merely involves application of the same 
methods as for private decision makers. Thus analysis for public decision support 
should, for example, take into account any possible downside risk, and should include 
consideration of ways to deal with bad consequences if and when they eventuate.  
The need for proper ex ante appraisal of public choices raises the issue of what utility 
function should be used in such analyses. In the case where all the consequences of the 
policy choice are adequately measured in money units via some form of benefit-cost 
analysis leading to a distribution of a measure of worth such as net present value, Arrow 
and Lind (1970), in a seminal analysis of public investment under uncertainty, argued 
that society is usually able, at least potentially, to pool its risks across the whole 
population. Consequently, they argued, society as a whole should be neutral towards 
risk. This view supported that of Samuelson and Vickrey (1964). 
Cases that Arrow and Lind (1970) say are exceptional do, however, occur. They 
relate mainly to risk in project appraisal in less developed countries and deserve brief 
comment here. Little and Mirrlees (1974, p. 316) outlined when something other than 
the maximisation of expected net present value would be appropriate. Briefly, when a 
public project is large relative to national income, when project returns are highly 
correlated with such income, or when a particular disadvantaged group is involved, 
there is a strong case for explicit accounting for the riskiness of alternative actions by 
use of an appropriate risk-averse social utility function. 
So we present our sixth principle:  
 
This principle should surely not be contentious. That is not to say, of course, that it is 
always followed. Politicians or public servants may choose to make such decisions in 
quite risk-averse ways if they fear that a bad outcome will adversely affect their chances 
of re-election or of advancement of their careers. But at least professional analysts 
advising on such decisions should avoid the temptation to be too conservative. For a 
discussion of the appropriate risk deduction in public project appraisal, see Anderson 
(1989). 
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The state contingent approach (Chambers and Quiggin 2001, 2004) is an important 
theoretical development that should lead to improved methods of risk analysis, 
particularly, we suspect, in econometrics. In this latter connection, Just has proposed the 
following principle (Just 2003, p. 140, principle 9):  
³µIf the expected utility hypothesis holds, then the relative advantages of the state-
contingent versus parametric distributional representations of risk depend on a compari-
son of the number of states of nature versus the number of distributional moments 
required for the adequate representation of the producer¶s stochastic problem.´ 
We believe that this principle does not do full justice to the state contingent approach 
as propounded by Chambers and Quiggin. In particular, Just seems to believe that the 
state contingent approach depends on the validity of the expected utility hypotheses, 
whereas Chamber and Quiggin indicate that the underlying preference structure can be 
much more general. However, in so far as the approach is based on specifying the out-
come of some risky choices contingent upon the state of nature that eventuates, it is 
quite familiar to prescriptive decision analysts. Leaving aside work with an econometric 
orientation, and some mathematical programming studies, it usually proves more expe-
dient to do decision analysis in terms of discrete states of nature rather than in terms of 
distributions of outcomes defined in terms of (moments of) continuous distributions. 
Chamber and Quiggin, however, do much more than this. As we understand it (and 
we do not find it easy going), they show how adopting a state contingent form of 
analysis allows risk to be incorporated into the conventional theory of production, rather 
than being treated as a modification thereof, as was propounded, for example, in the 
classical work of Magn~ssen (1969). In particular, with the state contingent approach 
one is able to use the dual formulation of optimal operating conditions to encompass 
risk and its consequences. Rasmussen (2003, 2004) used the approach to derive criteria 
for optimal production under uncertainty. He has elucidated the conditions under which 
a risk-averse decision makers will use more or less input than if they were risk neutral; 
information that he argues is useful in both descriptive and normative work. 
How this undoubtedly important development might affect the ways that the analysis 
of risky choice will be implemented in the future remains to be seen. Only now is 
empirical work based on this approach in agriculture and resource economics beginning 
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to appear (J. Quiggin, pers. comm. 2005), all so far of an econometric nature. We are 
not aware of any applications of the theory to date in a predominantly prescriptive 
setting, so we are currently doubtful whether the approach will prove very useful for 
applied normative studies in agriculture and resource economics. In this circumstance, 
and in view of our lack of confidence in predicting how state contingent theory may be 
developed and applied, we think it best that we do not attempt to specify any principles 
relating to it. 
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As indicated earlier, our treatment of this topic is founded on our view that all 
probabilities are subjective statements of degrees of belief in propositions about the 
world. We recognise that this view is not accepted by many, perhaps most, agricultural 
and resource economists. However, this is not the place for missionary zeal to try to 
covert the unbelievers. Instead we ask the uncommitted or unsure to consider the 
following points: 
1. The notion of probabilities as subjective has been supported by some distinguished 
thinkers. The theory is based on reasonable axioms and sound logic, and there exist 
well-tried methods of implementation (e.g., Ramsey 1931; de Finetti 1964, 1972, 
1974; Savage 1954, 1971; Stasl von Holstein 1970, 1974). 
2. The notion of deriving probabilities from relevant, reliable and reasonably abundant 
relative frequency data is entirely consistent with the subjectivist view. 
3. Rejection of the notion that subjective probabilities can have meaning implies that no 
systematic analysis is possible to support most of the important risky choices faced 
by farmers, resource managers, policy makers and, indeed, everyone.  
 
The necessity for and appropriateness of subjectivity in decision analysis has found 
wide acceptance (e.g., Raiffa 1968; Anderson et al. 1977; Morgan and Henrion 1990; 
Wright and Ayton 1994; Clemen 1996). As long ago as 1951, Arrow wrote that ³the 
uncertainty of the consequences >«@ is basically that existing in the mind of the 
chooser´.  
When there are abundant data that are relevant and reliable, the subjective and relative 
frequency views of probability will usually coincide. However, it is not always 
recognised that accepting probabilities drawn from some historical data set involves a 
subjective belief that the historical data are relevant to the future period when the 
uncertainty being modelled for decision analysis is revealed. In other words, adopting 
probabilities based on historical data involves an explicit yet seldom examined 
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assumption of stationarity. The subjectivist is more likely to question this assumption 
while the objectivist will usually be obliged to adopt it willy-nilly. 
More usually, the difference between the two main contending views of probability 
occurs when data are sparse or absent. Then rejection of the essentially subjective nature 
of choice can lead to some unfortunate mistakes, e.g., use of inappropriate but available 
data, ignoring the most important problems or variables for lack of historical data, use 
of cross-section data to reflect uncertainty over time, etc. (Watson and Anderson 1977; 
Taylor and Zacharias 2001; Just 2003, p. 153). Yet in the analysis of many important 
risky decisions the all-too-familiar situation is one in which abundant and relevant data 
are neither available nor obtainable at reasonable cost.  
If data are sparse or absent, the subjectivist will seek to use the best obtainable 
probability judgments about important uncertain variables to allow analysis to proceed, 
whereas the objectivist or frequentist can do nothing, which is surely unsatisfactory.  
The above discussion leads to us our next principle: 
 
 
 
 
The implications of acceptance of this proposition are far-reaching, extending far 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, we have sought only to draw out some 
implications for applied decision analysis in what follows. 
Of course, subjective probabilities are not any old numbers that come to mind. First, 
they must be numbers that obey the usual rules of probability theory. Moreover, they 
should be consistent with what the decision maker (or the decision analyst acting for 
that person) really believes about the uncertainty to be faced. Thinking rationally about 
probabilities means striving for consistency in one¶s whole network of beliefs. So, for 
example, if some quantitative or qualitative information is believed to be relevant to the 
assessment of the probability of some uncertain event, the assigned probability should 
reflect the belief in that information.  
More generally we propose the following related principle: 
 
This means that possible sources of information should be considered and evaluated as 
to their suitability in supporting the formation of probability judgments. Sometimes 
there are no existing useful data and none can be collected. For example, this usually 
will be the case for risks that have not yet been experienced. Then probability assess-
ment comes down to wholly subjective judgments by the decision maker (or those 
assisting for that person). If there are some data already available, they need to be care-
fully evaluated to assess their relevance, reliability and applicability to the assessment 
task at hand. As discussed below, particularly when data are sparse or suspected to be 
biased in some way, the raw numbers will need to be combined with some subjective 
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judgments before they can be used. In the following sub-sections we deal in more detail 
with the two cases of no data versus some data. 
Whatever is to be done in assessing probabilities, it is generally important to make 
the process as transparent as possible ± always tell what you did (Morgan and Henrion 
1990, ch. 3). The case for transparency in public decision analysis is obvious, but even 
in private decisions, documenting what was done and assumed facilitates later review 
and offers greater opportunities to learn from past failures and successes. It seems to us 
that too much published work in agricultural and resource economics is based on 
probability assumptions that are inadequately documented and justified. We suspect that 
this deficiency comes from the fallacious belief that probabilities must be relative 
frequencies. When, perforce, they come from dubiously appropriate data, authors may 
feel under pressure to ³paper over´ the deficiencies to satisfy editors and reviewers. 
The subjective assessment of the probabilities for some decision problems usually needs 
to start with clarification of the nature of the uncertainty to be faced. This process, 
which may take some considerable time and thought, may be assisted with the use of 
influence diagrams or probability trees (Clemen 1996). Once the preliminaries are over, 
several techniques have been proposed for the elicitation of subjective probabilities, 
such as the equivalent lottery method, visual impact methods and fractile methods (e.g., 
Hardaker et al. 2004a; Morgan and Henrion 1990, ch. 6; Clemen 1996). 
The chief difficulty with any such methods is the problem of bias in subjective 
probability assessments. There is substantial evidence in the psychological literature of 
the various types of error that people typically make in such assessment tasks (see, e.g., 
Plous 1993 for a comprehensive review or the summary in Hardaker et al. 2004a, pp. 
86±91). These include over-confidence in one¶s judgment (leading to too tight 
distributions), avoidance of uncertainty, misconception of chance, anchoring problems, 
and problems due to motivational incentives. On the other hand, there is rather little 
research (and almost none in agricultural and resource economics) on how to overcome 
these problems. However, asking subjects for reasons and getting them to construct 
careful arguments in support of their judgments appear to reduce bias and improve the 
quality of the assessments (Morgan and Henrion 1990).  
Another method that has been used, seemingly with some success, is the training of 
assessors with use of scoring rules. The procedure is to reward assessors who assign 
distributions to almanac-type questions in such a way that the total expected score is 
maximised by assigning probabilities consistently with what they really know about the 
uncertain questions posed. Marks are awarded using a proper scoring rule, which is one 
such that assessors maximise their expected scores if they report their true beliefs (e.g., 
Savage 1971; Matheson and Winkler 1976; van Lenthe 1993). The rewards may be in 
the form of valuable prizes or, more usually, merely the satisfaction of doing well, 
perhaps in comparison with others, and from improving one¶s own performances with 
gained experience.  
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With so little empirical evidence on how to minimise bias in subjective probability 
assessments, it is impossible to be confident about what is best. However, we tentatively 
propose the following principle: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this context, we also flag the need for more research to calibrate probability distribu-
tions obtained from farmers or others using different elicitation methods with a view to 
improving the guidance that can be offered to analysts about how best to proceed. 
Calibration of probabilities is discussed further below. 
Some bias in probability assessment appears to arise from a failure of imagination. 
This may be very important when assessing low probability events. Hence it may help 
to ³brainstorm´ to bring into mind a more complete set of possible futures. Had this 
been done in relation to the risk of tsunamis in the Indian Ocean, the now proposed 
warning system might have been in place before the recent disaster struck. But perhaps 
that is unfair because there is a particular difficulty in probability assessment in relation 
to rare events that have very serious consequences. Almost by definition, there are few 
or no data available for such events. There is also evidence that people may not even 
want data on the probability of an extreme event occurring (Kunreuther 2002). The 
assessment difficulties appear to arise from two causes. First is the failure of 
imagination already mentioned. If an assessor has had no experience of a particular out-
come, he or she may have difficulty in imagining it could occur. For example, few 
people had imagined a terrorist attack on the scale and using the methods of September 
11th. Even if an event can be conceived, it is obviously difficult to assign a meaningful 
probability to it when it has hardly ever or never happened before. The second problem 
arises because of the difficulty people have in discriminating between very small 
probabilities. A chance of one in a thousand may seem not much different from a 
chance of one in a million, yet the implications for risk management of the difference 
between the two can be very great. Experiments have shown that people can get a better 
grasp of low probabilities if they are related to familiar scenarios described is realistic 
detail (Kunreuther et al. 2001).  
Normally the decision maker¶s personal probabilities are the ones that should be used in 
decision analysis, but in cases where that person is not well informed about the risk to 
be faced, it obviously makes sense to seek expert advice. Use of experts may be particu-
larly apposite in public decision making. Moreover, if it makes sense to consult one ex-
pert, it seems obvious that it would be better still to consult several, provided that each 
brings some unique insights to the problem at hand. Our next principle, therefore, is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e. 
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For a comprehensive discussion of the topic of use of expert opinion in forming 
subjective probabilities, see Cooke (1991).  
The proviso about the need for independence provides a clue to answering the 
questions of how experts should be selected and how many should be used. The aim 
should be to pick people who are knowledgeable about the risk to be faced but who 
come from different professional backgrounds or who have had different experiences of 
the world. Moreover, there is likely to be diminishing returns from expanding the 
number of experts called upon in that the criterion of reasonable independence will 
become harder to fulfil as the number is increased. While there is no hard and fast rule, 
perhaps four or five will usually be a reasonable number.  
The use of a number of experts leads to several questions. It is sound practice to try 
to understand why the different experts assign different probabilities to the same events. 
If there are fundamental and inconsistent differences between experts, it may be 
inappropriate to combine their different opinions since to do so may produce an 
³average´ distribution that is meaningless (Morgan and Henrion 1990, pp. 164±168). 
But then more inquiry will be needed to try to resolve the issue. Normally, however, it 
will make sense to combine the assessments of the different experts into the single 
probability distribution(s) needed for analysis. The problem is to decide how. A number 
of methods have been proposed and there is some uncertainty about what is best 
(Clemen and Winkler 1999). There is general agreement that it usually makes sense, 
when possible, to start by pooling information among the experts to try to reduce 
differences between them in their perceptions. On the other hand, this process can 
introduce bias unless it is done carefully. Getting the experts together to share ideas may 
seem sensible, but there is clear evidence that this can be dysfunctional. For example, 
sometimes the group dynamics seem to work to produce a much more extreme and 
more over-confident assessment than any of the individuals would have suggested 
alone. This effect, known by the unfortunate name of ³group think´ was blamed for 
some of the most serious intelligence failures that preceded the recent invasion of Iraq. 
Other types of dysfunction may occur, for example, when one strong-willed or high-
status but ill-informed individual is able to dominate the group.  
These sorts of problems led to the development of forms of information sharing 
followed by reassessment in which the anonymity of the individual group members is 
preserved. The best know of these methods is the so-called Delphi method, which has 
found reasonably wide application (Linstone and Turoff 2002). These considerations 
lead to our next proposed principle: 
 
Getting experts to share information can be expected to lead to some convergence of 
views in most cases. However, a complete consensus will rarely be achieved unless the 
members are allowed to meet and to work out for themselves a way of resolving their 
differences. As noted, that is usually not a good idea. Consequently, the analyst is left 
with the problem of how to combine different probabilities (or probability distributions) 
from the different experts. This problem has attracted considerable attention in the 
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literature.4 According to French (1985), several procedures have been proposed, some 
on pragmatic grounds and others justified axiomatically. A number of impossibility 
theorems have been advanced, but then disputed. However, apart from behavioural 
methods, such as the Delphi method, two main options seem to be dominant these days. 
First is the use of some form of weighted average of the individual distributions. Several 
different weighting schemes have been proposed, with the best usually being weights 
assessed according to the past performance of the experts in similar assessment tasks 
(e.g., Clemen 1989; Clemen and Winkler 1999). Second is the use of Bayesian methods. 
Although these have considerable appeal in logic, there are operational problems 
relating chiefly to the difficulty in obtaining appropriate likelihoods. On the other hand, 
Jouini and Clemen (1996) have proposed an innovative approach to Bayesian 
aggregation in which dependence among sources is encoded into a copula. However, 
experimental evidence seems to suggest that forming averages of experts¶ distributions 
often works about as well as more sophisticated methods (Clemen and Winkler 1987) 
so, by recourse to Occam¶s Razor, that may be the best choice till something superior is 
discovered.  
Since the consensus problem is still not fully resolved, we choose not to advance any 
principle relating to it. Instead, we urge that analysts should become acquainted with the 
pros and cons of different existing methods, as reviewed by Clemen and Winkler 
(1999), and should keep an eye open for new developments.  
For events that occur repeatedly, it is possible to match an assessor¶s subjective 
probability judgments against observed relative frequencies. For example, if, on a 
number of occasions, an economist has specified a 30% chance that the world price of 
wheat will rise in the coming period, wheat prices should have subsequently risen on 
about 30 per cent of those occasions for the forecasts to be well calibrated. If this is not 
the case, the forecaster needs to look to his or her laurels to do better in the future. 
Poorly calibrated (unreliable) probability assessments imply some significant bias that 
should be corrected. See Morgan and Henrion 1990, ch. 6 for a review. We therefore 
propose the following principle: 
 
 
Assessed discrete probabilities can be plotted against actual frequencies to yield a cali-
bration curve. The curve for a well-calibrated assessor should be close to the diagonal. 
Assessors have a tendency to be overconfident, so the probabilities tend to be too near 
certainty (0 and 1) on the calibration curve. Although feedback and training of assessors 
can be arduous, it should be useful, even essential, in fields such as economic and 
weather forecasting (Murphy and Winkler 1977). Moreover, the more such studies are 
reported, the more we can learn about types and sources of bias in probability 
assessment, increasing the opportunities to minimise or avoid these problems. 
                                                 
 4 The size of the literature on the consensus problem is indicated by the fact that a Google search for 
³combining probabilities experts´ produced about 53 000 hits. We have discovered almost no 
publication in agricultural and resource economics that deals explicitly with this important issue. 
ts. 
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We now turn to the situation where there some data available upon which to base the 
assessment of probabilities. In this case, it is important first to consider the reliability 
and the temporal and spatial relevance of the data to the assessment of the uncertainty at 
hand. How many observations are there? How were they obtained and by whom? What, 
if anything, was done to verify and validate the data? If the data were a sample, how 
representative are they of the population from which they were drawn? How large were 
errors in collecting and reporting the data likely to be? Is the stationarity assumption 
justified? Were the data collected on the farm or for the environment for which the 
decision analysis is to be performed? Or did they come from some location perhaps 
quite far away? If the data are likely to be biased for any of these or other reasons, ways 
to try to correct for such bias should be considered and, if possible, applied. In the wost 
cases it may be best to discard misleading information and to use more subjective 
assessments as described above. 
It is obvious that basing probability assessment on dubious data alone is not rational. 
Hence, we suggest the following principle: 
 
We wonder how often the above-mentioned questions are considered in professional 
studies. Certainly, some data ³laundering´ goes on, chiefly discarding outlying observa-
tions that would otherwise spoil goodness of fit or significance statistics. How often 
these manipulations are unreported it is impossible to know. Obviously, we advocate 
much more transparency in such matters. 
Any measurement can be regarded as a sum of the true value, systematic error 
(measurement bias and sampling bias), and sampling error (e.g., Schlaifer 1959, ch. 31). 
The sample selection method is crucial to minimise the systematic error. There are 
weighting and frequency procedures that can be used to reduce sampling bias. However, 
estimating the possible magnitude of systematic error is difficult and of necessity 
involves a large element of subjective judgment.5  
Ideally, samples should be validated against the population for main characteristics 
related to the ones of interest for the decision analysis. There is a tendency to under-
estimate the effect of little-known sources of error so that the existence of systematic 
error may not be recognised (Morgan and Henrion 1990, ch. 4). A typical example on 
sampling bias is use of experimental yield data in farm analysis. Response under 
experimental conditions will in general significantly exceed the response achieved 
under workaday farm conditions (Davidson et al. 1967; Dillon and Anderson 1990). 
Historical time-series data should normally be adjusted for inflation, and technological 
change may cause a need for trend-adjusted data (Hardaker et al. 2004a, ch. 4). If there 
are known and predicable causes for irregularities in the process generating the data, 
obviously these should be taken into account.  
Agricultural production is highly fragmented and heterogeneous, yet many statistics 
are only available at some level of aggregation. As Just (2003) stresses, farm-level ana-
lyses should be based on micro-level data, so there is a need to collect panel data over 
several years. Such data are generally essential for a thorough analysis and calculation 
of probabilities for the serious risks that farmers face. Presumably, it is the lack of such 
                                                 
 5 Of course, we do not regard the fact that subjectivity is involved as a reason not to attempt 
correction. 
ta. 
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micro-level time-series data that has led some researchers into the error of using 
aggregated data to assess risk at the individual farm level (Just and Weninger 1999).  
In cases with sparse data, or even when the data are relatively abundant, it usually 
makes sense to smooth out any irregularities in the distributions. The case for 
smoothing lies in the fact that a single observation of some continuous uncertain 
variable is made up of a predictable or deterministic component plus or minus a 
stochastic deviation. The irregularities in an empirical distribution are a result of 
sampling from the true distribution and thus reflect sampling error. On the other hand, it 
is almost always reasonable to assume that the population follows a smooth distribution, 
implying that the irregularities should be eliminated in fitting the distribution (Schlaifer 
1959, 1969; Anderson 1974; Anderson et al. 1977).  
Smoothing can be done assuming that the marginal cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) of some continuous uncertain quantity will be a smooth curve, typically but not 
always sigmoidal (Anderson 1974; Anderson et al. 1977, ch. 2; Clemen 1996; Hardaker 
et al. 2004a). Hence it makes sense to smooth out the irregularities typically found in 
even relatively large samples, and the smaller the number of observations, the greater 
the need for smoothing (Whittle 1957).  
Before any smoothing is attempted, all supplementary information that can make the 
process more trustworthy should be considered, especially when the data are sparse. For 
example, it will usually be reasonable to assume that the upper and lower bounds of a 
probability distribution will be more extreme that those observed in a small data set. 
Often expert judgments can be used to get estimates on such bounds and perhaps also an 
estimate of the modal value (Vose 2000).  
There are several options to smooth probability distributions from data. One option is 
to plot the data points using the rule that the k-th ranked observation is an estimate of 
the k/(n + 1)-th fractile, then to draw a smooth curve approximating these points by 
hand (Schlaifer 1959; Hardaker et al. 2004a, pp. 69±71). Or non-parametric methods 
can be used to estimate a smoothed empirical CDF, such as spline and kernel methods 
(e.g., Whittle 1957; Silverman 1986). A third option is to fit a theoretical distribution to 
the data (e.g., Feldman et al. 2004; Vose 2000, ch. 9; Hardaker et al. 2004a, ch. 4), and 
there exists software such as BestFit and Simetar to do this. Although distribution fitting 
may be preferred by some as ³more objective´, our preference is usually for some 
method of non-parametric smoothing. This is because we believe that it will often be 
unsafe to assume that an uncertain quantity of interest conforms to some convenient 
parametric distributional form. Moreover, especially if the risk is concentrated in one of 
the tails of the distribution, some tests of goodness of fit of fitted distributions may be 
unsatisfactory. 
If the CDF is to be smoothed, hand smoothing may be argued to give the best oppor-
tunity to incorporate additional information about the shape and location of the 
distribution, but other more formal methods may be preferred in some cases. For 
example, in a simulation model Lien et al. (2004) used a multivariate kernel density 
estimator to smooth sparse input data. 
When data for probability assessment are inadequate, it makes sense to consider 
collecting more information. Two options should at least be considered: collecting more 
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empirical data or seeking probability assessments from experts, as discussed above. 
There is evidence of the human tendency to limit the amount of information sought or 
used in choice, especially for problems where imagination is difficult (Morgan and 
Henrion 1990, ch. 6). These considerations lead us to Principle 14: 
 
Before taking steps to collect more information, one should be sure that the necessary 
information really is not available from other sources. Then it is a matter of comparing 
the expected value of the new information with the likely costs of collection (including 
the costs of delay). In principle, Bayesian preposterior analysis can be used to 
determine the expected value of collecting more information (e.g., Anderson et al. 1977; 
Clemen 1996, ch. 12), even though it is often difficult in practice to do the calculation. 
However, an informal benefit-cost analysis of collecting more information can always 
be done. That analysis should take account of the difficulties and pitfalls in data 
collection, especially problems with social surveys (Pannell and Pannell 1999). 
The aim in collecting more information for decision analysis obviously is to be able to 
make better probability judgments. If the new data amount to an increase in the size of 
sample, they can be added to the existing data and the analysis can proceed as outlined 
under 5.8 above. However, in other cases the analyst is faced with the task of making 
use of data of different types or from different sources. The danger in this case is that, as 
psychologists have shown, most people exhibit conservatism in this task, meaning that 
they do not revise their prior probabilities sufficiently in the light of the new evidence 
(e.g., Peterson and Beach 1967). At least in some cases, Bayes¶ theorem can be used to 
overcome this problem, since it ensures that full weight is given to any additional 
information that becomes available (Anderson et al. 1977). Hence, we propose the 
following principle: 
 
 The essential feature of Bayes¶ theorem is that it provides a logical mechanism for 
consistent processing of additional information. Bradford and Kelejian (1978) have 
show how Bayesian updating can improve the quality of information used to construct 
forecasts of wheat prices. Kristensen (1993) illustrated how Bayesian updating can be 
applied in dynamic programming. However, one common problem in the application of 
Bayesian updating is how to get the likelihood probabilities. These measure the 
reliability of the additional information. If there is no empirical evidence on which to 
base the likelihoods, they may be have to be subjective judgments. In that case, it may 
be as easy to assess the posterior probabilities directly, although a Bayesian calculation 
may still be useful as a cross check.  
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Most decision problems involve more than one stochastic variable. It is easy to show 
empirically that if stochastic dependency between two or more variables is ignored for 
the sake of ease in modelling, the distribution of the output variable(s) may be seriously 
in error. Hence, we propose the following principle: 
 
The problem with stochastic dependency is that it seldom easy to assess and it can be 
even harder to model effectively in the analysis. As a result, it is all too common to find 
that dependency has been assumed away, or, if accounted for at all, linear correlations 
are assumed to represent what is happening adequately, usually applied in conjunction 
with the assumption of a multivariate normal distribution. In reality, the dependency 
between uncertain variables may differ at different levels of those variables, and, as 
empirical findings show, the assumption of normal distributions for many agricultural 
phenomena is much less likely to be a good representation of reality than its ubiquitous 
adoption suggests (e.g., Anderson 1982; Ramirez et al. 2003). Assuming normal 
distributions inappropriately may lead to serious errors in the tails of the distributions 
where often the most serious risks occur (e.g., insurance and derivative instruments, 
food safety risk, and environmental risk). If the marginal distributions are not assumed 
to be normal (or lognormal), it is usually possible to draw correlated samples in Monte-
Carlo simulation accounting only for rank correlations (not the more familiar linear 
product-moment correlations). Again, because rank correlations do not tell the whole 
story about stochastic dependency (and, in fact, also measure only linear dependency), 
the sampled values may be a poor representation of the ³true´ stochastic dependency. 
There are, of course, circumstances in which dependencies can legitimately be ignored, 
for example if the dependency is weak, or it is between variables with little influence on 
the output variables of interest (Smith et al. 1992). Techniques helpful to determine 
whether it is necessary to model dependency are discussed in Vose (2000, ch. 11) and 
Richardson (2004, ch. 7). 
When dependency has to be addressed, a number of methods are available. For 
example, if abundant relevant data are available, either the data can be allowed to 
³speak´ by using the historical information as direct input to some stochastic 
simulation, or, in some cases, appropriate statistics can be obtained to define the joint 
distribution incorporating the dependencies between variables. But unfortunately, 
abundant data are more the exception than the rule, and commonly at best only sparse 
data are available. In cases with sparse or no relevant data, some methods have been 
proposed for the subjective assessment of joint probability distributions (Fackler 1991; 
Clemen and Reilly 1999; Hardaker et al. 2004a, p. 172). But eliciting peoples¶ beliefs 
about joint distributions is a demanding task, especially for more than two variables 
(Morgan and Henrion 1990, ch. 6). 
A second approach is based on the notion that, if the dependency is real and not a 
statistical artefact, there must be underlying causal factors at work. If these can be 
identified and their distributions and effects quantified, the cause of dependency can be 
modelled. Burns and Clemen (1993) suggest the use of influence diagrams for this 
purpose. Hardaker et al. (2004a, pp. 82±86) call the method the hierarchy of variables 
approach. Of course, a common problem with this approach is lack of data. For 
example, crop yield may be a function of a range of variables, such as soil conditions, 
rainfall, temperature, use of seeds and fertilisers, field work and timing, harvesting 
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technique and timing, etc. Even using all the best information and advice, it will seldom 
be possible to model all causal factors and their effect on crop yield, so a decision must 
be taken about what can be a ³good enough´ representation of the causality.  
The conditional distribution method is another procedure that has been used to tackle 
the problem of appropriately modelling multivariate non-normal probability distribu-
tions for simulation and other types of risk analysis. Gelman and Speed (1993) discuss 
the combination of marginal and conditional distributions that suffice to determine a 
joint distribution. Taylor (1990) illustrates this approach as one of the two procedures 
described in his paper. However, if one variable depends on many other variables (so 
that many conditional probabilities are required) the procedure is not very operational.  
In recent years copula methods have become increasingly popular, especially in 
finance, as tools to describe and simulate multivariate distributions (Cherubini et al. 
2004). Given two or more marginal distributions, the copula function describes how 
they ³come together´ to define the multivariate distribution. Since the copula function 
separates out the dependence structure from the marginal distribution functions, any 
types of marginal distributions can be joined together into a joint probability 
distribution. Moreover, once specified, the copula allows for Monte Carlo sampling 
from the implied joint distribution.  
There are many different copulas to choose from (Nelson 1999). Some of the copulas 
better account for the dependency in the tails of the stochastic variables than others. 
Copulas are estimated statistically from a data set, so the method can usually only be 
applied when abundant data are available.  
In the agricultural and resource economics literature, application of copula methods 
to account for dependency between stochastic variables is limited. Richardson and 
Condra (1978), Ramirez (1997), King (1979), Taylor (1990), and Richardson et al. 
(2000) all used normal (or Gaussian) copulas in their models to account for stochastic 
dependency. However, none of these studies used the full power of copulas to join non-
normal distributions, suggesting that there is a need for more research on the scope for 
use of copulas in applied risk analysis in agriculture and resource economics. 
Another little used approach in decision analysis in agriculture is bootstrapping 
(Elfon 1979). The bootstrap method together with look-up functions such as exist in 
Excel can be used to simulate a multivariate empirical distribution. Bootstrap simulation 
of multivariate distributions maintains the correlation between variables and in addition 
the higher-order moments characteristics of the variables (Richardson 2004). When 
sparse data exist, some smoothed bootstrap simulation procedures can be done (Elfon 
1979; Silverman and Young 1987). 
Finally, for a review of some further methods of dealing with dependency, see Biller 
and Ghosh (2004). 
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As stated in the Introduction, the aim of this paper is to stimulate thinking and debate 
about how decision analysis can be done better in agricultural and resource economics. 
Our list of principles may be contentious. We welcome criticism and suggestions for 
improvement. It is our hope that these ideas will challenge some established practices 
that we think are misguided, even wrong. We think it is time for members of the 
profession to stop hiding behind the disguise of supposedly respectable ³objectivity´ 
and to be more honest about the many subjective judgments that inevitably have to be 
made their work. It is time for the profession to recognise that thoughtful and 
transparent subjectivity in not only ³OK´, but is the only logical basis, at least for the 
analysis of risky decisions in agriculture and natural resource economics. 
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